Private security companies in Africa: security for some, tragedy for many

The northeast of Mozambique is heading fast to become one of the chronic instability areas of Africa. In 2011, rich natural gas deposits were discovered in and off the coasts of Cabo Delgado, one of the poorest and the most marginalized provinces in the country. As the years passed, aspirations for poverty alleviation turned into frustration. An armed insurgency appeared in 2017 only to shatter the fragile security environment in the region.

The latest attack of the insurgents, allegedly linked to the "Islamic State" (IS), took place on 24-27 March and left dozens dead and thousands displaced in the city of Palma. To quell the attack, the authorities employed, along with the national armed forces, a private security company from South Africa, namely the "Dyck Advisory Group".

The Mozambique government, rather than addressing socio-economic problems of the local population, adds fuel to the fire by bringing in private security. In this context, two combat helicopters and support personnel were leased in mid-2019 from Eric Prince, the founder of infamous “Blackwater”. Later on, the Russian Wagner Group was engaged. The group sent nearly 200 "military consultants" to the region last year. When Wagner proved inefficient in the fight against the insurgency, the government signed another contract with the South African Dyck Group.

Despite being resurfaced in northeastern Mozambique, the use of private security companies in internal conflicts, in protection of mining areas, operated by international companies, is not a new phenomenon for African countries. While it can be traced back to the colonial era, private security companies and their activities proliferated across the continent in the 1990s. There are three main reasons for this expansion. Firstly, skilled military personnel, who were demobilized by the end of the Cold War, established companies in order to provide private security services to fragile states. Secondly, reluctance of global powers to intervene in the crises provided a considerable room for private security companies. Last but not least, the structural adjustment programs, imposed on African countries by the international financial institutions, crippled the administrative capacities of African states including their security sectors. As a result, African states relied increasingly on private security in dealing with insurgency and protecting critical wealth generating areas, particularly natural resources.

The South African private security company “Executive Outcomes” stands out as the first private security company which participated actively in armed conflicts. It played a crucial role in determining the winning side in the Angolan civil war. It was also leased in Sierra Leonean civil war and in the fight against the "Lord’s Resistance Army". The British “Sandline International” dared even to prepare for a coup d’état in Equatorial Guinea in 2004. More recently, the Russian Wagner group is allegedly operating in almost two dozen African countries. China on the other hand, is taking steps to expand its footprint in private security, in order to protect its investment and citizens on the continent.

Private security companies, with which this article is concerned, are put to use in African countries in fighting internal conflicts, as well as in protecting natural resources and the companies operating these resources. As Peer Schouten points out, a distinction is made between "useful Africa" and "useless Africa" by African political elite and their international partners. In this context, wealth generating and taxable areas where the interests of the said actors intersect, constitute the “useful Africa”. These areas are strictly protected by both national security forces and private security companies. "Useless Africa" is practically the rest of the territories, which are paid attention to, only if they pose a threat to useful Africa.

However, there are several problems with private security companies engaged in conflict situations or allowed to use lethal weapons in Africa. In this respect, private security companies see the conflicts of host countries as mere security problems, which are to be solved through exerting brute force. Ignoring political, economic and sociological aspects of these conflicts, this mode of operation aggravates the problems. Some companies are also accused of violating human rights to the extent that those offenses could add up to be described as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Regrettably, the international law is not yet equipped with necessary mechanisms to effectively hold these companies responsible for their crimes.

To sum up, the situation in the northeast of Mozambique is the latest example of the use of private security companies with little accountability. Under the current circumstances, the instability is likely to continue in Cabo Delgado and the Mozambique government can be expected to prioritize security over fundamental problems such as poverty and underdevelopment. As long as this problematic approach is maintained, its costs will mostly be borne by the people of Cabo Delgado.