Wagner crisis between Mali and France

Fotoğraf: Reuters/Amadou Keita

Political crises in sub-Saharan African countries are generally analysed through the lenses of external actors. It is implied or directly stated that former colonial countries and global powers played a decisive role in these developments. Internal political circumstances in the country in question and the personal and social factors behind the decisions and actions of the ruling elite are usually disregarded. Moreover, the rulers of African countries are shown as passive members of international relations.

A similar process is taking place regarding the recent diplomatic crisis between France and Mali. The crisis emerged in the aftermath of the news about the negotiations between the government of Mali and the Russian mercenary group Wagner for a security deal. According to reports in the press, the draft agreement contains terms such as Wagner sending around 1,000 Russian mercenaries to Bamako in order to provide VIP protection to senior Malian leaders and training the Malian army, and receiving in return about 10 million dollars per month.

Having already deteriorated relations with current Malian current leaders since the coup d’état in May, France launched a diplomatic offensive to prevent the deal. At ministerial level, French authorities stated that such an agreement "did not comply with France's Sahel strategy", that Wagner's settlement in Mali was France's "red line" and it may result in the isolation of Mali. Germany weighed in by implying that Mali’s choice would be between France, Germany, the European Union and the United Nations on one side, and Russia on the other.
It is conceivable that France doesn’t want to lose another “backyard” in Africa to Russian clout after the bitter experience in the Central African Republic in 2018. In addition, France is afraid of suffering another blow in its foreign relations while she has not yet recovered the shock, arising from Australia’s cancellation of the 66-billion-dollar submarine tender. What is more is that Macron cannot stomach any further foreign policy embarrassments before the Presidential elections in April next year. But what are the motivations of the Malian -currently intertwined- political and military elite to work with Wagner?

They are well aware of the fact that Mali is not on an equal footing in its relations with France. Yet, they can employ certain strategies in order to try to readjust their relations and to increase their economic and political powerbase. French sociology professor Jean François Bayart explains* this strategy with the concept of “extraversion”. In this regard, he argues that African rulers are not passive players, and can manipulate their unequal relations with foreign powers, by opposing or by joining them, to further their interests. The Malian elite seem to be applying a similar strategy, as revealed by the Wagner crisis. At this stage Malian authorities might be using their Wagner venture for their personal and/or national interests. It is an effort into reshaping the dependency relationship with the former colonial power or an attempt at switching from one dependency to another.

This approach is not new for Mali's foreign relations. The first President of the country Modibo Keita adopted socialism and established close relations with Soviet Russia, largely due to the colonial legacy and the bitter outset of relations with France. Until his overthrow by a coup d’état in 1968, he received military and financial aid from the Eastern Bloc and sent students to these countries.

When it comes to possible pull factors for Malian rulers to draw near to Russia, which is not at all an altruist power, one can first mention that the Malian elite perceive a threat originating from France. And this perception is not fully unfounded given France's role in the several high-level assassinations, civil wars and coup d’états in its former colonies. Therefore, Malian leadership could be leaning towards another power, which they may see as "the lesser evil" under the current circumstances.
Secondly, Paris imposes its position on Bamako especially in the security sector. It does not allow Malian authorities to establish a dialogue channel or negotiate with the armed groups which are designated by France as terrorists. This was the case in the process leading to the peace agreement processes in 2015, as it was for the national reconciliation conferences in 2017 and 2019. Yet, reaching out to those groups is considered essential by the Malian authorities and the public in putting an end to insecurity and improving humanitarian conditions in the country. In this respect the Malian leadership, by looking at other alternatives, seems to be trying to break free from at least some of the structural constraints imposed by France.
In addition, the way in which the US pulled out of Afghanistan and the Taliban's taking over, created a perception of insecurity among the Malian leaders who are also fighting against "Islamist/rebel" groups. This perception is aggravated by France's announcement on cutting in half its 5,000-strong military presence in the Sahel region. Therefore, it could be seen as reasonable if the decision makers in Mali, by contacting Wagner, seek assurances for their own security and regime's survival.

Finally, the recent increase in anti-French sentiment in the country might have played a role in the Wagner initiative. Even though France has been the main actor in the fight against armed groups in Mali since 2013, the overall security situation in the country has deteriorated. A considerable part of the Malian population is of the opinion that the aim of France is not to fight the rebels and terrorists, but to keep the country under occupation and plunder its riches. The legitimacy of the leaders, who are deemed to be backed by France, lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. As a matter of fact, this is what happened to President Keita, who was overthrown by a coup d’état last year. In this context, there is pressure on the ruling elite to find alternative partner(s) to France.

As can be seen in Mali's attempt to engage the Russian Wagner group, the political elite of African countries try to safeguard and reinforce their political and economic powers. These endeavors might sometimes bear the expected outcomes. Given the precedents however, these efforts are more likely to end up in disappointment.

*Bayart, J.-F. (2006). L’Etat en Afrique: la politique du ventre (Nouvelle éd.) Fayard.