Cards will soon be reshuffled in Ethiopia *

                                                                Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali. Photo: Reuters

History seems to be repeating itself in Ethiopia. In May 1991, the rebel forces led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) captured Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa after 15 years of struggle. The final offensive took five months. Four days after the capture of the strategic city of Dessie, 350 km north of Addis Ababa, President Mengitsu Haile Mariam resigned; fleeing first to Nairobi, and then to Zimbabwe, where he would spend the rest of his life.

A similar process is taking place today, but in an accelerated manner. This time the civil war started in November last year between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray regional government. Abiy Ahmed, who became the prime minister in April 2018, started the not-so-subtle process of eliminating the Tigrays from politics and economy of the country under the guise of strengthening the central government. However, the steps he took triggered a civil war between TDF and the central government, also involving the Eritrean national army and local “ethnic” militias. However, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's attempt to crush the Tigray regional forces is about to cost him not only his political career, but also risks the integrity of the country. A year later into the conflict, the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF) and their allies Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) are in a position to threaten Addis Ababa.

However, TDF seems not to be rushing to control the capital city. Because first of all, it could be a risky move. But more importantly, the Tigray elite are well aware of the fact that their 20-year-long antidemocratic rule created hatred among other ‘ethnic’ groups, and trying to reassert themselves will backfire. Therefore, TPLF may prefer waiting until a broad alliance is formed with the participation of other "ethnic" groups, as it was in 1991, rather than seizing the country's administration alone. As a matter of fact, it was announced that nine anti-government groups, including TDF and OLA, joined forces against the Abiy administration.

In order to out Tigray from power, it is now more obvious that Abiy had based his plans on isolating the Tigray regional administration first, and in case of an armed resistance; crushing it together with Eritrea by a coordinated attack on two fronts. But he made three crucial mistakes.

First, he failed to turn the deep resentment among all ‘ethnic groups’ towards Tigray into a country-wide solid front against the rebellious region. The most obvious indicator of this is that the Oromo Liberation Army, currently the biggest ally of the TDF, is the largest militia of Oromo, the ethnic group which Abiy himself belongs to. Second, He underestimated the Tigray elite’s and people’s military capacity and resilience. Despite being attacked by the Ethiopian army from the south, the Eritrean army from the north, and Amhara militias from the west; Tigray forces took the offensive after a short period of retreat and regrouping.

Abiy's third mistake is to fall out with Egypt, concurrently with his vital move to suppress Tigray, on the construction of the Renaissance Dam and the flow of the Nile River. Having declared that the undisrupted flow of the Nile River is an existential threat for itself, Egypt possibly did not skip any opportunity, among which lies supporting the anti-Abiy actors on the ground to weaken the Ethiopian government.

It can be suggested that the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia, at least partly, played a role in the last two years’ developments in Sudan. As a matter of fact, Sudan was not against the dam project and rather impartial in the dispute. After the coup d’état which toppled Al-Bashir in 2019 though, Egypt succeeded in drawing Sudan on its side. So much so that last May, the two countries held a joint military exercise on Sudanese soil named as the "Guardians of the Nile". 

However, Prime Minister Hamdok, who was supposed to become the head of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, was not fitting in this picture. Having inked a peace deal with the rebel groups in the country, he was against any escalation with Ethiopia over the contested Fashaga region, being well aware of its destabilizing effects, as well as huge costs while the country was already in severe economic crisis. He had stated that he would make every effort for Ethiopia's integrity, security and stability. 

Yet, the generals in Sudan, who have intimate relations with their Egyptian comrades and who allegedly sought and received prior blessing for both coup d’états from Egypt, do not have the same concerns. Following last months’ power grab, Sudanese generals now have a freer hand to play the game by Egypt’s wishes. Therefore, the military and political bill that Abiy will soon be paying is arising partly from his inability to fully isolate the TDF by setting Egypt and Sudan against him.

Given the reality on the ground, it is highly unlikely that Abiy can repel the TDF/OLA forces who are at a threatening distance to the capital. With a population of 5 million, Addis Ababa cannot last long given the fact that its main logistics arteries are choked by the rebels. Moreover, a government trapped in the capital will lose legitimacy every passing day. There are speculations that Abiy could be removed from office by a military coup to pave the way for negotiations and facilitate the transition process. Abiy might have already begun to consider host country alternatives that would grant him long-term residence.

In the immediate future, rebels and the central government might start negotiating under the auspices of the US (under the guise of African Union mediators), an interim period, followed later on by the revision of the existing federal system or creation of a novel one. However, the fact that political power in Ethiopia is seen as a zero-sum game as well as the worsened hostilities between 'ethnic groups’, scale down the ground significantly for mediation and a possible reconciliation.

Formulation of a more democratic political system is crucial for peaceful coexistence of the country's more than 80 ‘ethnic’ groups. Failing that will further exacerbate the antagonism between the main constituents of Ethiopian society and eventually might lead to disintegration of Ethiopia, which has been able to preserve much of its imperial borders so far despite going through radical political changes.

* An extended Turkish version of this article was first published on the Turkish edition of the Independent. https://www.indyturk.com/node/432931/t%C3%BCrki%CC%87yeden-sesler/etiyopyada-kartlar-yeniden-da%C4%9F%C4%B1t%C4%B1lacak