Biden Administration’s Africa Strategy: Can rhetoric dictate reality?

 

Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

"Why are we in Africa?" former US President Donald Trump asked then-National Security Advisor John Bolton back in 2018. We do not know whether Bolton responded to the question. But he could have mentioned rivalry with Russia and China, the recognition of Africa’s geopolitical significance, the pursuit of US national interests, the endeavor to help African countries’ development aspirations, the fight against terrorism, the promotion of democracy and good governance, and the reinforcement of US trade and investment. While each of them could arguably be a reasonable answer to the question, the US’s longstanding policy towards Africa is to try implementing all of these policies simultaneously. 

The Biden administration’s new US strategy for Africa is not immune from these contradictions. Announced last week by the Secretary of State Antony Blinken, the strategy outlines four priority areas, namely the respect for the sovereignty of Sub-Saharan African countries, the advancement of democracy and good governance standards, the attainment of sustainable development, and the adaptation to climate change and transition to clean energy.

Although the strategy is high on the rhetoric of equality and partnership, as well as the geopolitical importance of the continent, African countries have never been one of the priorities of the US. They have long been treated as a source of problems in terms of health, migration, and security. The US’s interest in Africa has been limited in scope and time and, more importantly, was reactionary to the developments in and outside the continent. This particular approach, also discernible in the new strategy for Africa, creates at least three interrelated contradictions. 

Contradiction 1: Pawns in geostrategic competition vs. Sovereign countries requiring an individual approach

As Herman Cohen argues in his book published in 2020, the US's approach to the continent has been determined according to the rivalry among the global powers. For instance, in the 1957 National Security Council assessment, Africa was characterized as a battleground and a prize in global strategic competition. During the Cold War, the USA tried to keep its partners and allies in power while preventing the Soviet Union from gaining ground and allies on the continent. 

Particularly in the last two decades, China has replaced Russia as the strategic contender in Africa due to its unprecedented economic clout. China’s rise forced the US to modify its policy towards Africa. In this vein, countering China was entrenched in the strategy of “pivot to Asia” during Obama’s presidency. Later on, the initiatives such as the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act (BUILD Act) adopted during Trump’s presidency to improve economic and commercial relations with the continent were employed as a countermove against China's Belt and Road Initiative. 

As hinted by Blinken, the deep-seated policy of countering geopolitical rivals in Africa, namely Russia and China, persists under the Biden administration. The "Law on Combating Russia's Harmful Activities in Africa" adopted in the House of Representatives in April is a case in point. The new Africa strategy attempts to remedy the Trump administration’s mishandling of Africa policy. In fact, Trump arguably did nothing but carry out the long-standing realpolitik in terms of the US’s Africa policy but in a blatantly clumsy and disrespectful manner. Therefore, the Biden administration recalibrated the rhetoric by emphasizing the "relationships based on mutual respect" and “partnership.” 

However, viewing African countries as the subjects of geopolitical competition leads to the perception among Africans that the USA is not interested in them as sovereign countries. In the same vein, it is widely believed that the US's harsh criticism of China, with regard to its alleged exploitations on the continent, is not due to altruism or in defense of African countries but due to the frustration of being economically outpaced by China on the continent.

This contradiction curtails the US’s influence and leverage on the African political elite. For instance, the Biden administration’s attempts to stop the civil war in Ethiopia have so far been futile. In South Sudan, where the support of the US was decisive in its quest for independence, American diplomacy could not prevent President Salva Kiir and Vice Riek Machar from postponing the elections for two more years. The US eventually pulled out of the monitoring mechanisms of the peace process. 

Contradiction 2: Countering terrorism vs. Advocating democracy and human rights

The fight against terrorism became one of the major components of the US’s Africa policy following the devastating simultaneous attacks on its embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. With the 9/11 attacks, several African countries became the battleground in the global fight against terrorism. In this context, the US supported African leaders, with little or no regard for their democratic credentials, who collaborated with the US in the fight against terrorism. Former President Barack Obama, who was hailed as “a strong spokesman for human rights and democracy,” lectured African heads of state on democracy and good governance. Yet, he remained silent about the anti-democratic practices in the countries where the US had a military presence. President Trump did not even bother adopting such a discourse.

Currently, about 6000 US military personnel are stationed at over 10 US bases in African countries. At least one-third of the US development aid in Africa goes to the security sector. For instance, US assistance covers 10% to 15% of the Ugandan army's total budget, which has a dismal human rights record under President Museveni's autocratic rule.

The Biden administration, in its turn, has not altered the general approach to Africa. The White House did not react to the military coup in Chad, where the son of late President Idris Deby was unconstitutionally installed as the head of state after Deby’s death. It goes without saying that Chad is one of the US’s partners in the fight against terrorism. Drone attacks, constantly criticized by human rights organizations, continue in the Biden era. In this respect, the gap between the words and actions of Washington on democracy and human rights is a significant stumbling block for the US's Africa policy. 

Contradiction 3: Rhetoric about trade and investment vs. The reality of structural constraints 

Designated as one of the four priorities in the new Africa strategy, the objective of furthering economic and commercial relations with African countries is an uninterrupted aspect of the US African policy. The African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), adopted in 2000, aims to enable African countries to enter the US market duty-free and pave the way for US investments in Africa. Although not very effective in practice, AGOA still is the basis for trade relations between the USA and Africa. However, despite the annual US-Africa business summits and numerous Presidential initiatives over the past 10 years, US trade with Sub-Saharan Africa is almost a third of what it was in 2008. In the same period, China more than doubled its trade volume with the continent. Moreover, the direct investments of the USA in the continent, rather than increasing, decreased from $36.6 billion in 2008 to $34 billion in 2018. 

Source: IMF DOTS, China-Africa Research Initiative

The factors on the African side, such as the lack of capacity to finance infrastructure investments, the barriers to doing business, corruption, poor infrastructure, insecurity, and high political risks, hamper a meaningful increase in trade and investment. On the US side, though, the lack of clear information and proper guidance for investors, the prejudices of the US private sector towards the continent, and most importantly, the US companies’ little appetite for taking risks play the decisive role in the current impasse. The new Africa strategy has little to offer to clear these hurdles. In this context, due to structural problems, Washington's willingness to develop economic relations with Africa has not yet resonated with the US private sector.

Conclusion

The incumbent US administration adopted a strategy of employing rhetoric, such as African countries' strategic importance and sovereignty, partnership in addressing global problems, ensuring development, and advancing democracy.

The Biden administration’s discourse on Africa is comprehensive, yet it needs to deal with its contradictions. In this vein, it seems that the new US policy on Africa does not do enough to handle the deep-seated issues of geopolitical rivalry between the US and China in Africa and the fight against terrorism. Besides, the administration does not offer any remedies for the structural obstacles to economic relations.

If the US does not take sincere action to resolve the deep-seated contradictions in its approach to Africa, it will continue losing more and more ground on the continent.