Is Al-Shabaab in the footsteps of Taliban?

 In my take, published in the Turkish edition of the Independent, I argue that the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s taking control of the country could repeat in Somalia, given the fact that there are several similarities between the two countries.

First and foremost, same as in Afghanistan, a “state building” project, led by Western countries, has been going on in Somalia for over a decade now.

Secondly, Taliban and Al-Shabaab, qualified both as radical Islamist insurgent and terrorist organisations, have tasted the power and, though for a short time, ruled over the country.

Thirdly, there is no sign of winning the war against Al-Shabaab, as was the case with Taliban, despite the deployment of a 20000-men-strong international peacekeeping mission (AMISOM), supported by US airstrikes. On the contrary, Al-Shabaab is reportedly consolidating its power. It provides security in the areas under its control and settles disputes. It collects taxes all over south-west Somalia including and especially in the capital city Mogadishu. In this respect, it has established itself as a quasi-state authority.

Furthermore, Al-Shabaab enjoys a certain legitimacy, even though it is considered by large segments of the Somali population as the lesser evil compared to a central government, which not only is corrupt but also fails utterly to provide the most basic services. Al-Shabaab is also considered as leading a struggle against foreign invaders.

Last but not least, while the US withdrew from Afghanistan, the withdrawal of AMISOM is being seriously considered by the international community. Military experts estimate that the falling south-west Somalia in the hands of Al-Shabaab could be even faster than the case in Afghanistan.

At this point if we take a step back to see the big picture, the problems in Afghanistan and Somalia mostly arise from or are worsened by the “state building” ventures under the tutelage of the Western powers. These attempts undermine the “state formation” process which, As Berman and Lonsdale argue, manifests itself as conflicts, negotiations and concessions among all segments of society.

In this respect, the international community should stop giving fish, or teaching how to catch a fish to post-conflict societies; instead, let them decide the way in which they are going to catch their own fish. The sole responsibility of the international community can and should be to deter, as much as possible, the use of force and violation of fundamental human rights, without directly interfering with the processes. In addition, although Al-Shabaab has seemingly adopted strategic patience until the eventual withdrawal of AMISOM, negotiating with the organisation should be a priority for Somali authorities in order to prevent further loss of lives.

On the other hand, the possibility of negotiations or even a genuine dialogue with Al-Shabaab in Somalia will at least partly depend on the manner in which Taliban will try ruling Afghanistan and the international community’s reaction to it.